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After having been neglected for years in favor of analyses of the rise and
forms of protest activities, the study of the outcomes and consequences of
social movements has received a strong boost in recent years. The number
of systematic works—both case studies and, though less often, comparative
analyses—that focus on movement impact is growing at a sustained pace,
thus contributing to filling an important gap in our knowledge of social
movements and, more generally, contentious politics (see Giugni 1998 for a
review). Yet this gap remains very large in the field of immigration politics.
In this specific field, scholars have largely avoided to study protest behavior
and collective mobilizations (for exceptions concerning the mobilization of
migrants and minorities, see e.g., Ireland 1994; Blatt 1995; Fibbi and Bolz-
man 1991; Giugni and Passy 1999; Martiniello and Statham 1999), and even
when they did focus on protest, they have been interested in explaining its
rise (in particular, that of the extreme right) rather than their effects on pol-
icy making. As a result, we still know very little about the impact of protest
activities on the decision-making process in the field of immigration and eth-
nic relations.
Given this state of affairs, this chapter pursues three goals that are all re-
lated to the study of the policy impact of protest activities. Our first aim is em-
pirical and consists in assessing the impact of the mobilization by three social
movements that are directly implicated in immigration politics: (1) migrants
and ethnic minorities, (2) the extreme right, and (3) pro-migrant or solidarity
organizations and groups. We focus on the (potential) substantive effects of
these three collective actors on migration policy, intended as their ability to
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influence political decisions on issues pertaining to immigration and ethnic
relations. Furthermore, we focus on a specific historical period, namely the
years from 1990 to 1998. This is a period during which: (1) discussions of the
role of minorities in western Europe, especially in regard to the actual or sup-
posed “multiculturalization” of society, have been brought to the fore of pub-
lic debates; (2) the extreme right has witnessed a growth both in terms of
electoral strength and in terms of racist or violent actions; and (3) the soli-
darity movement has consolidated its position within the civil society and be-
come increasingly active in the migration field. To have an empirically
grounded assessment of the impact of these three collective actors and of
which actor is more effective is therefore all the more important today.
Our second aim is theoretical and follows two lines of reasoning. On the
one hand, we draw from the literature on citizenship and integration regimes
to explore the hypothesis that models of citizenship, that is, prevailing con-
ceptions and shared understandings of the criteria of membership in a na-
tion, provide a framework for explaining the varying impact of challenging
groups that mobilize in the field of immigration and ethnic relations. Fol-
lowing a theoretical perspective recently adopted in an international re-
search project, we conceive of models of citizenship as a structure of politi-
cal opportunities for the impact of collective actors on migration policy. Our
choice to focus on France and Switzerland, two countries that have two dis-
tinct models of citizenship, follows from this opportunity approach. On the
other hand, we continue an avenue of research we explored elsewhere
(Giugni 2001, 2004; Giugni and Passy 1998), suggesting that we take into ac-
count the possibility that the policy impact of these movements is deter-
mined by the joint presence of protest activities and contextual factors (i.e.,
political, economic, and socio-demographic).
Our third and final aim is methodological. Since the literature on social
movements still lacks systematic and empirically grounded studies of their
consequences, we propose an analysis of the effects of migrant, extreme-
right, and solidarity movements on migration policy following a longitudinal
approach, more precisely by means of time-series analysis techniques,
which are particularly well suited to establish causal relationships among
variables of interest. We should note, however, that in this respect our study
is largely exploratory, sensitizing to an approach rather than testing a theory.
MODEL OF CITIZENSHIP, POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES,
AND THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Recent comparative work on social movements and contentious politics
points to the decisive role of political opportunity structures for explaining
the emergence of protest, the forms it takes, and its potential impact (e.g.,
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Brockett 1991; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam 1996; McAdam et
al. 2001; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). Typically, scholars identify political op-
portunities with certain aspects of the institutional context of movements,
most notably the degree of access to the political system for challenging
groups, the capacity and propensity towards repression by the political au-
thorities, and the configuration of power in the polity (see McAdam 1996).
The underlying assumption in this approach is that the political oppor-
tunity structure thus defined applies to all kinds of movements and chal-
lenging groups, regardless of the nature of their claims and the policy field
they are targeting. Now, this is debatable both on theoretical and empirical
grounds. Theoretically, some have shown that the perception of political
opportunities varies from one movement to the other and that, as a result,
different movement react differently to the same signals (Kriesi et al. 1995:
chapter 4). Furthermore, different policy areas yield different sets of op-
portunities to challengers (Kriesi et al. 1995: chapter 4). Even a cursory
look at actual mobilizations by different movements suggests that some
movements are more radical than others. While this might in part depend
on the propensity to radicalization by certain groups, a more plausible hy-
pothesis is that certain movements and policy areas have specific opportu-
nity structures that impinge on the mobilization of actors who address is-
sues pertaining to those areas.
Together with some colleagues, we have recently begun to specify the
concept of political opportunity structure for the field of immigration and
ethnic relations.1 Following the lead of recent comparative work on national
regimes for the incorporation of migrants and on citizenship rights (Brubaker
1992; Castles 1995; Favell 1998; Freeman 1995; Joppke 1999; Koopmans and
Kriesi 1997; Koopmans and Statham 1999a, 2000b; Safran 1997; Smith and
Blanc 1996; Soysal 1994), we look at the ways in which prevailing citizenship
and integration regimes provide different sets of opportunities for the claim-
making of collective actors in this field. We suggest that collective action in
this field is enabled or constrained not only by political institutions, but also
by shared understandings and collective definitions of the groups involved
and the ways in which their members should be included in or excluded
from the national community, in other words by the historically and cultur-
ally embedded shared understandings of the rights and duties of migrants
and, conversely, of nationals towards migrants.
Models of citizenship can be conceptualized as a combination of two main
dimensions: an individual dimension referring to the formal criteria for ob-
taining citizenship rights or membership in the national community, and a
collective dimension referring to the cultural obligations posed on migrants
for obtaining such rights. On the first dimension, we may distinguish be-
tween an ethnic and cultural conception which on the legal level becomes
the jus sanguinis rule, on the one hand, and a civic and territorial conception
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of citizenship which translates into the jus solis rule, on the other (see
Brubaker 1992). On the second dimension, we may distinguish between a
monist or assimilationist view of the cultural group rights according to which
migrants are supposed to assimilate to the norms and values of the host so-
ciety, on one side, and a pluralistic view in which the state grants and some-
times even promotes the recognition of ethnic difference, on the other.
Combining these two dimensions, we obtain four ideal-types of citizen-
ship and integration regimes (Koopmans and Statham 1999a, 2000b): an 
ethnic-assimilationist (or differentialist) model, an ethnic-pluralist (or segre-
gationist) model, a civic-assimilationist (or republican) model, and a civic-
pluralist (or multicultural) model. Germany and Switzerland are examples
of the first type, South Africa under Apartheid of the second type, France of
the third type, and Britain and the Netherlands of the fourth type.2 Thus, ac-
cording to this typology, France and Switzerland have two distinct models
of citizenship. In France, there is a civic and political definition of the nation
together with a tendency towards imposing the republican values and
norms upon migrants. In Switzerland, the assimilationist view of cultural
group rights combines with an ethnocultural conception of citizenship.
In this perspective, the specific structure of political opportunities pro-
vided by citizenship and integration regimes channels the claim-making in
the field of immigration and ethnic relations. It therefore should favor claims
that have greater political legitimacy and public resonance within the larger
cultural framework provided by the prevailing model of citizenship (Giugni
and Passy 1999; Koopmans and Statham 1999b). Specifically, the shared un-
derstanding of the ideal-type of the nation as a civic and political community
in France, which has an inclusive definition of citizenship and where all cit-
izens must conform to the principles of the republican state, should provide
larger opportunities to actors who mobilize around issues pertaining to the
integration of migrants in the host society. Since migrants in France are con-
sidered as belonging to the national community, the larger share of their
claims bears on the rights and position of resident migrants (i.e., immigrant
policy) rather than the regulation of flows (i.e., immigration policy). In con-
trast, the more exclusive, ethnic-based conception of citizenship in Switzer-
land, which in this respect resembles to Germany, should favor actors and
claims concerning immigration control and the regulation of immigration
flows, as this kind of issues is more legitimate in this context and resonates
with the larger framework provided by the prevailing model of citizenship.
Table 8.1 shows that this is indeed the case.3 For all three collective actors
under study, the share of claims concerning the situation of resident migrants
(minority integration politics and racism/antiracism) is higher in France. In
contrast, claims pertaining to the regulation of immigration flows (immigra-
tion, asylum, and aliens politics) are more important in Switzerland. To be
sure, immigration control claims by migrants are more frequent in France,
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but even in this case the ratio between immigration policy and immigrant
policy is clearly in line with our hypothesis. Furthermore, we have to take
into account the fact that in Switzerland most migrant claims deal with home-
land politics issues rather than host society ones, which by the way is also a
result of the more exclusive conception of citizenship in this country.
The main goal of this chapter, however, is not to explain the thematic fo-
cus of migrant, extreme-right, and solidarity movement claims, but rather to
assess the impact of these actors on migration policy and, concerning mod-
els of citizenship, to determine to what extent their policy impact depends
on the dominant definition of the nation in civic-territorial or ethnocultural
terms. Specifically, we hypothesize that claims addressing immigrant policy
have more chances to find a political space and to be successful in France,
for they resonate with this country’s civic-based model of citizenship. In con-
trast, we think the terrain should be more favorable to claims directed at im-
migration politics in Switzerland, which are both more legitimate and reso-
nant in the context of an ethnic-based definition of the nation.
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC,AND SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC 
RESOURCES FOR THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
ON MIGRATION POLICY
As the social movement literature has shown, movements are relatively pow-
erless collective actors. Therefore, their potential impact is likely to become
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Table 8.1. Thematic Focus of Migrant, Extreme-right, and Solidarity Movement
Claims in France and Switzerland
Extreme Solidarity 
Migrants Right Movement
France
Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics 26.6 4.0 36.4
Minority integration politics 40.8 8.1 15.3
Racism/antiracism 21.6 22.7 47.7
Other claims (not in the migration field) 11.0 65.3 0.7
Total 100% 100% 100%
N 473 856 426
Switzerland
Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics 11.9 24.8 53.0
Minority integration politics 11.5 10.5 15.9
Racism/antiracism 15.3 32.0 27.2
Other claims (not in the migration field) 61.3 32.7 4.0
Total 100% 100% 100%
N 261 153 151
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greater to the extent that they can exploit certain resources which are avail-
able in the larger environment and which may facilitate their task. Political,
economic, and socio-demographic resources are certainly among the major
ones, and the ones on which we would like to focus in our analysis, in ad-
dition to the cultural resources coming from the prevailing models of citi-
zenship. To begin with, students of social movements have often stressed the
contribution of political alliances to the movements’ cause. Political oppor-
tunity theorists, in particular, argue that the presence of powerful allies
within the institutional arenas largely facilitates the task of social movements
(e.g., Amenta et al. 1992; Burstein et al. 1995; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Kriesi
et al. 1995: ch. 9; Lipsky 1968; Tarrow 1993, 1998). Established parties play
an especially important role in this respect (Tarrow 1993), as they can take
up movement claims within the institutional arenas and translate them into
policy changes.
Political opportunity theory suggests a number of hypotheses regarding
the impact of social movements and claim-making in the field of immigration
and ethnic relations. Concerning in particular the role of political alliances,
the aspect of political opportunity structures which interests us here, mi-
grant, extreme-right, and solidarity movements should be more successful
when their potential institutional allies are in power and, more generally,
when political alignments are favorable to them. The left (in particular, the
Socialist party) is traditionally the most important ally for migrants and the
solidarity movement, which therefore should have greater chances of suc-
cess when the left is gaining power. Furthermore, their impact should go in
the direction of liberalizing the admission policy or granting more rights to
resident migrants and minorities, as this reflects their interests and demands.
The picture is somewhat more complicated for the extreme right, as es-
tablished parties (included those of the right) do not always support far-right
positions and groups. Nevertheless, at least when it comes to migration pol-
icy, the traditional right can still be considered as a potential ally of the ex-
treme right, in spite of their often ambivalent relationship. As a result, ex-
treme-right mobilization should have greater chances of success when the
right gains power and, of course, even greater when extreme-right parties
themselves benefit from an electoral growth. Furthermore, its impact should
consist in tightening both immigration policy and immigrant policy, the typ-
ical demand of the extreme right. However, as some have argued in particu-
lar for the French case (Favell 1998; Hollifield 1994; Weil 1995), in the mi-
gration political field there is often a sort of “hidden consensus” among
political parties which results in similar positions by left and right parties, es-
pecially with regard to the regulation of immigration flows. Therefore, at
least in the case of immigration policy, political alignments should not mat-
ter that much. The question is open to empirical scrutiny.
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Institutional allies are a political resource for migrants, extreme-right, and
solidarity movements. However, students of immigration politics have often
underscored the role of certain contextual factors such as economic (e.g.,
unemployment), socio-demographic (e.g., immigration flows), cultural (e.g.,
models of citizenship), and legal-normative (e.g., the existence of domestic
or international courts and the emergence of transnational normative frame-
works) factors. All these aspects represent external resources that can be ex-
ploited by the movements under study to increase their chances of success-
fully influence migration policy. Here, in addition to political alliances and
models of citizenship, we look at economic and socio-demographic re-
sources, two aspects that are likely to strongly affect short-term changes in
migration policy at the domestic level.
The economic situation of the host country is among the most significant
factors affecting migration policy (see e.g., Hollifield 1992; Straubhaar and
Weber 1994). A good or bad economic situation can provide crucial resources
to social movements that try to influence policy making in the field of immi-
gration and ethnic relations. When the economy is bad and unemployment
high, governments typically respond with restrictive policies. In contrast, in
times of economic growth and low levels of unemployment, liberal measures
are more likely to occur. This argument applies in particular to immigration
policy and much less to immigrant policy, i.e. it concerns above all the regu-
lation of immigration flows as well as the criteria of admission of foreigners
to the country in general and to the labor market in particular. In this respect,
we can make different predictions as to chances of success of the three move-
ments under study. On the one hand, liberalizing immigration policy is not a
feasible option in periods of high unemployment. Immigrant policy, on the
other hand, is relatively independent of the situation of the labor market. We
therefore expect both migrant and solidarity movements to have an impact
on immigrant policy (but not on immigration policy) when unemployment
increases. Such impact, furthermore, should manifest itself in measures fa-
vorable to the situation of migrants in the host society, as in periods of eco-
nomic recession or stagnation states typically close the borders and, at the
same time, are more willing to act to improve the integration of resident mi-
grants. On the other hand, even in a civic-assimilationist context such as
France’s, which tends to channel the claim-making of collective actors to-
wards minority integration politics, during times of rising unemployment the
extreme right should have a restrictive impact on immigration policy (but not
on immigrant policy), as claims for such measures may take advantage of the
general policy orientation in times of bad economic conditions.
The pressure coming from immigration flows and ethnic diversity is a fur-
ther potential determinant of policy change in the field of immigration and
ethnic relations (see e.g., Miller 1981; Rex and Tomlinson 1979; Richmond
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1988), and hence another external resource that may increase the chance of
success of social movements aiming to influence policy making in this field.
This factor is partly linked to the previous one, as the impact of immigration
flows generally depends on the economic health of a country, in the sense
that the pressure coming from immigration tends to diminish when the la-
bor market is unfavorable to recruiting new labor force. Therefore, the pre-
dictions we make about socio-demographic factors follow a reasoning sim-
ilar to that concerning economic factors. On the one hand, high levels of
immigration express a strong socio-demographic pressure that tends to lead
to a stricter border control. At the same time, however, measures for the in-
tegration of resident migrants are more likely to be taken. We therefore ex-
pect that, when immigration flows are perceived as being too high, both mi-
grant and solidarity movements will have an impact on immigrant policy
(but not on immigration policy). Such impact, furthermore, should be fa-
vorable to the migrants’ situation in the host society, as a strong socio-
demographic pressure in terms of increasing immigration flows pushes state
authorities to restrict the access to the country and makes measures for the
integration of resident migrants more likely. On the other hand, in a similar
situation, we expect the extreme right to have a restrictive impact on immi-
gration policy (but not on immigrant policy), as policy makers often re-
spond to extreme-right mobilization in the simplest possible way: by tight-
ening immigration control.
DATA RETRIEVAL AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS
To assess empirically the impact of the mobilization of the three movements
under study on migration policy we use a technique based on time-series
analysis. This approach allows us to incorporate time into the explanation of
the effects of protest activities on public policy. In spite of the obvious fact
that political and decision-making processes are time-dependent, only rarely
has previous work analyzed the effects of social movements and other col-
lective actors with a method that takes time into account (but see Burstein
and Freudenburg 1978; Costain and Majstorovic 1994; Giugni 2001; Giugni
and Passy 1998). Yet an approach that allows the researcher to capture the
dynamic nature of movement outcomes has clear advantages over a static
approach. Specifically, the chronological ordering of observations in time-
series analysis yields a stronger case for causal inference than cross-sectional
approaches (Janoski and Isaac 1994), especially if a temporal lag is intro-
duced in the models. This is all the more important when one is studying the
outcomes of protest, as establishing the causal relationship that links social
movements to their alleged outcomes is one of the major reasons that have
hindered previous research in this field.
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The unit of analysis consists in three-month periods that aggregate the ob-
servations on the variables of interest concerning the political claim-making
(both by the three movements under study as well as other actors), the eco-
nomic situation (unemployment rate) and the socio-demographic pressure
(immigration flows). The data on claim-making come from the international
MERCI research project.4 Claims were retrieved by content analyzing every
second issue of one national newspaper in each country for the period from
1990 to 1998.5 From the original, event-based file, the data were then aggre-
gated into three-month counts of claims and stored into a new file specifi-
cally organized for time-series analysis, that is, with chronologically ordered
observations.
Appendix 8.1 gives the description of all the variables used in the analy-
ses that follow. We use claim-making data to measure most of the variables
concerning the intervention of collective actors in the public space on is-
sues pertaining to immigration and ethnic relations: the mobilization of mi-
grants (MINACT), that of the extreme right (ERACT), and that of the soli-
darity movement (SOLACT); pro-minority and anti-minority claims
(PROMIN, ANTIMIN);6 and pro-minority and anti-minority claims by parties
(PROPART, ANTIPART), as a way to operationalize the political alliances of
the three movements under study. In addition, our indicators of changes in
migration policy are also based on the claim-making data, specifically on
the subset of claims represented by political decisions: one measure of mi-
gration policy in general (MIGRPOL); two measures for the two more insti-
tutionalized issue fields, i.e. immigration control policy (IMMPOL) and mi-
nority integration policy (INTPOL);7 and finally two measures for the
position of policy, regardless of the issue field to which they refer, i.e. pro-
minority and anti-minority political decisions (PROMP, ANTIMP).8
In addition to the indicators of claim-making, we have two variables that
allows us to control for the effect of the economic situation and the socio-
demographic pressure: the unemployment rate (UNEMP) and the immigra-
tion rate (IMMRATE).
The time-series analysis performed here aims to find significant relation-
ships between various independent variables measuring the mobilization or
claim-making of collective actors, the economic situation, and the socio-
demographic pressure, on the one hand, and various indicators of migration
policy, on the other. This analysis has three important features. First, it is
longitudinal, that is, we look at the impact of changes over time in the vari-
ables of interest on policy changes. This allows us to take into account the
inherently dynamic nature of the political process. Second, we look at
lagged dependent variables. Including a temporal lag (in this case, a three-
month time unit) is a way to strengthen causal inference. Third, in some of
the analyses, we include a number of interactive terms. We do so with the
aim of gauging the role of certain external resources (political, economic,
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socio-demographic) that might facilitate the movements’ task. In other
words, we want to determine if the potential impact of the three movements
under study is facilitated by the simultaneous presence of their action and
by the external resources provided by the claim-making of political allies,
the economic situation, and socio-demographic pressure. Appendix 8.2
gives the list of all the interactive terms used in the analyses. These interac-
tive terms were created by multiplying, for each movement, the variables
concerning their mobilization with the variables referring to the claim-mak-
ing by parties (favorable to migrants in the case of migrants themselves and
the solidarity movement, unfavorable to migrants in the case of the ex-
treme-right, so as to capture the action of the political allies of the three
movements), the unemployment rate, and the immigration rate. Thus we
obtain three variables for migrants (MINPART, MINIMM, MINUNEM), three
for the extreme right (ERPART, ERIMM, ERNUNEM), and three for the soli-
darity movement (SOLPART, SOLIMM, SOLUNEM).
THE POLICY IMPACT OF MIGRANT,
EXTREME-RIGHT,AND SOLIDARITY MOVEMENTS
In this section, we try to answer three interrelated questions: (1) What is the
impact of migrant, extreme-right, and solidarity movements on migration
policy, controlling for political, economic, and socio-demographic contex-
tual factors? (2) Which of the three movements was more successful in its at-
tempt to influence political decisions on issues pertaining to immigration and
ethnic relations? (3) Which factors better predict changes in migration poli-
cies in France and Switzerland? To answer this questions, we perform a num-
ber of regression analyses that test for the existence of a significant relation-
ship between the indicators of claim-making, economic situation, and
socio-demographic pressure, on the one hand, and the various measures of
changes in migration policy, on the other.9
Table 8.2 shows the impact of migrant mobilization on migration policies
in France and Switzerland, controlling for four other factors: pro-minority
claims by parties (political allies), anti-minority claims by parties (political
opponents), the unemployment rate (economic situation), and the immigra-
tion rate (socio-demographic pressure). The upper section of the table refers
to France, the lower section to Switzerland. The results are clearly unfavor-
able to a potential impact of migrants on migration policy, as none of the co-
efficients for this collective actor are statistically significant. This holds for
migration policy in general (MIGRPOL), for the two institutionalized issue
fields—immigration control policy (IMMPOL) and minority integration pol-
icy (INTPOL)—and both for policy favorable (PROMP) or unfavorable
(ANTIMP) to migrants. In contrast, we have some evidence of an effect of the
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claim-making by parties. Both in France and Switzerland, this effect seems to
be on decisions concerning minority integration rather than immigration
control. Yet, as we can see in the second line of the table, only in France it
goes in the same direction than the parties’ demands, for pro-minority claims
at time t0 are related to a decline in anti-minority decisions at time t1. Finally,
both the unemployment rate and the immigration rate have a positive effect
on migration policy, attesting that both the situation on the labor market and
incoming flows of immigrants play an important role in the decision process
in the field of immigration and ethnic relations.
Table 8.3 shows the impact of extreme-right mobilization on migration
policy, again controlling for political, economic, and socio-demographic fac-
tors. Judging from our data, the effectiveness of the extreme right does not
seem to be much stronger than that of migrants. However, here we have
some evidence of an impact on political decisions, as the coefficient con-
cerning changes in minority integration policy in Switzerland is statistically
significant. Furthermore, even though none of the regression coefficients for
the case of France are significant, we find a negative effect on pro-minority
decisions if we include in the measure of the latter also repressive measures
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Table 8.2. Impact of Migrant Mobilization on Migration Policy 
in France and Switzerland
MIGRPOL IMMPOL INTPOL PROMP ANTIMP
(t1) (t1) (t1) (t1) (t1)
France
MINACT (t0) .14 .24 .13 .02 .31
PROPART (t0) .03 .14 .03 .29 .38*
ANTIPART (t0) .37* .19 .43** .32 .18
UNEMP (t0) .12 .50* .20 .11 .32
IMMRATE (t0) .21 .48* .11 .04 .23
R2 .21 .22 .18 .31 .24
Durbin-Watson 1.86 1.83 2.13 1.88 2.04
Switzerland
MINACT (t0) .07 .04 .01 .10 .01
PROPART (t0) .08 .07 .12 .07 .25
ANTIPART (t0) .28 .08 .36* .30 .05
UNEMP (t0) .81*** .49* .00 .64** .30
IMMRATE (t0) .68** .40 .06 .81*** .19
R2 .33 .13 .11 .34 .13
Durbin-Watson 2.10 2.02 1.69 2.06 2.00
*p  .10; **p  .05; ***p  .01
NOTE: Standardized regression coefficients generated with a generalized least-squared method of estimation
(Prais-Winsten) assuming a first-order autoregressive process. All variables are time series with a three-
month period as the unit of time (n35). All independent variables include a three-month lag. See Ap-
pendix 1 for variable labels and the number of cases in each original variable.
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against the extreme right (results not shown). Once again, the role of more
institutionalized actors such as parties appears to be stronger than that of
outsiders, especially in France and when they address anti-minority claims.10
Finally, the impact of the economic situation and socio-demographic pres-
sure is confirmed, although the significant effects of these variables disap-
pear in the case of France (but the value of the coefficients concerning im-
migration control policy remains strong).
Table 8.4 shows the impact of the solidarity movement on migration pol-
icy, always controlling for the unemployment rate and the immigration rate.
If migrants had no impact at all and the extreme right only a limited one, at
least in the period under study, the solidarity movement apparently was
somewhat more successful, particularly so in France. However, in the French
case, the sign of all statistically significant coefficients is negative. This means
that political decisions at time t1 have decreased when the mobilization of the
movement at time t0 has increased (or vice versa). As far as the indicator of
pro-minority decisions is concerned, this suggests that the movement was
clearly unsuccessful, for a decline in decisions favorable to migrants has fol-
lowed a growth of the mobilization or claim-making of the solidarity move-
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Table 8.3. Impact of Extreme-right Mobilization on Migration Policy 
in France and Switzerland
MIGRPOL IMMPOL INTPOL PROMP ANTIMP
(t1) (t1) (t1) (t1) (t1)
France
ERACT (t0) .25 .22 .25 .40 .07
PROPART (t0) .15 .01 .22 .60** .36
ANTIPART (t0) .46** .32 .33 .39** .36*
UNEMP (t0) .06 .38 .16 .18 .22
IMMRATE (t0) .15 .41 .07 .07 .23
R2 .21 .17 .17 .36 .17
Durbin-Watson 1.79 1.73 2.13 1.90 1.99
Switzerland
ERACT (t0) .04 .11 .44** .03 .07
PROPART (t0) .03 .13 .30 .04 .27
ANTIPART (t0) .29 .09 .23 .34* .04
UNEMP (t0) .79*** .50* .06 .60** .32
IMMRATE (t0) .65*** .40 .08 .74*** .21
R2 .32 .15 .23 .33 .13
Durbin-Watson 2.08 2.04 1.81 2.04 1.99
*p  .10; **p  .05; ***p  .01
NOTE: Standardized regression coefficients generated with a generalized least-squared method of estimation
(Prais-Winsten) assuming a first-order autoregressive process. All variables are time series with a three-
month period as the unit of time (n35). All independent variables include a three-month lag. See Ap-
pendix 1 for variable labels and the number of cases in each original variable.
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ment (or vice versa). In contrast, the Swiss solidarity movement seems to
have been able to produce a real substantial improvement in the rights and
position of migrants (as measured through the number of pro-minority polit-
ical decisions by state actors). Yet we cannot say which specific issue field
(immigration control or minority integration) is affected by this improvement.
The general impact of parties, especially in France, is one again confirmed,
yet with the ambivalence mentioned earlier concerning the direction (sign)
of the relationship for anti-minority claims by parties in France, while the real
effect of pro-minority claims by parties remains. The same holds for the real
effect of anti-minority claims by parties on minority integration policy in
Switzerland. Similarly, the findings regarding the impact of the unemploy-
ment rate and the immigration rate are consistent with those observed above.
Tables 8.2, 8.3, and 8.4 focus on the mobilization of three specific collec-
tive actors (migrant, extreme-right, and solidarity movements), controlling
for the effect of certain aspects of their political, economic, and social envi-
ronment that are plausibly related to changes in migration policy. Generally
speaking, these three movements express either a favorable (migrants, soli-
darity) or unfavorable (extreme right) position towards migrants. Yet other
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Table 8.4. Impact of Solidarity Movement Mobilization on Migration Policy 
in France and Switzerland
MIGRPOL IMMPOL INTPOL PROMP ANTIMP
(t1) (t1) (t1) (t1) (t1)
France
SOLACT (t0) .49** .36* .34 .32* .31
PROPART (t0) .20 .01 .18 .45** .25
ANTIPART (t0) .52*** .34* .47** .39** .42**
UNEMP (t0) .19 .49* .06 .01 .43
IMMRATE (t0) .21 .48* .07 .09 .36
R2 .35 .21 .26 .38 .20
Durbin-Watson 1.49 1.58 2.13 1.78 1.94
Switzerland
SOLACT (t0) .21 .24 .01 .43*** .11
PROPART (t0) .06 .10 .12 .04 .25
ANTIPART (t0) .26 .02 .36* .24 .07
UNEMP (t0) .67*** .42 .00 .38* .36
IMMRATE (t0) .52** .33 .05 .53** .24
R2 .36 .19 .11 .51 .15
Durbin-Watson 2.00 2.02 1.70 2.03 2.04
*p  .10; **p  .05; ***p  .01
NOTE: Standardized regression coefficients generated with a generalized least-squared method of estimation
(Prais-Winsten) assuming a first-order autoregressive process. All variables are time series with a three-
month period as the unit of time (n35). All independent variables include a three-month lag. See Ap-
pendix 1 for variable labels and the number of cases in each original variable.
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collective actors, in addition to these three movements and in addition to po-
litical parties, may have—and indeed do have—either a pro-minority or an
anti-minority stance. One may therefore want to ascertain the policy impact
of these two political “camps” in their entirety. The results are shown in table
8.5. Taken as a whole (i.e., including parties as well as any other collective
actor) and net of the effect of economic and socio-demographic constraints,
political claim-making in the field of immigration and ethnic relations ap-
pears to have been successful. This holds both for France and Switzerland,
attesting to a certain degree of responsiveness of these two democracies. The
only difference, yet a significant one, is that, while in France pro-minority
claims have produced a decrease in political decisions that basically deterio-
rates the rights and position of migrants, in Switzerland anti-minority claims
have caused a decrease in decisions that improve their situation. Thus, in a
way, a similar path has led to two substantially opposed outcomes: one fa-
vorable and the other unfavorable to migrants and minorities.
In sum, our analysis so far suggests a number of tentative conclusions
about the impact of migrant, extreme-right, and solidarity movements on mi-
gration policy in France and Switzerland. First, migrants do not seem to have
had any substantial impact on political decisions concerning immigration
and ethnic relations. Second, the extreme right was somewhat more suc-
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Table 8.5. Impact of Pro-minority and Anti-minority Claims on Migration Policy 
in France and Switzerland
MIGRPOL IMMPOL INTPOL PROMP ANTIMP
(t1) (t1) (t1) (t1) (t1)
France
PROMIN (t0) .25 .21 .28 .18 .54**
ANTIMIN (t0) .59*** .26 .72*** .29 .65***
UNEMP (t0) .25 .48* .04 .04 .57**
IMMRATE (t0) .29 .48* .00 .14 .40
R2 .27 .13 .38 .24 .29
Durbin-Watson 1.67 1.66 2.09 1.94 1.91
Switzerland
PROMIN (t0) .06 .10 .06 .03 .15
ANTIMIN (t0) .21 .01 .31 .36* .08
UNEMP (t0) .73*** .47* -.03 .55** .30
IMMRATE (t0) .68*** .40 .02 .88*** .13
R2 .27 .12 .09 .32 .11
Durbin-Watson 2.06 2.02 1.71 1.98 2.01
*p  .10; **p  .05; ***p  .01
NOTE: Standardized regression coefficients generated with a generalized least-squared method of estimation
(Prais-Winsten) assuming a first-order autoregressive process. All variables are time series with a three-
month period as the unit of time (n35). All independent variables include a three-month lag. See Ap-
pendix 1 for variable labels and the number of cases in each original variable.
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cessful in Switzerland, but not in France. However, we do not have evidence
allowing us to ascertain the direction of its impact. We know that its mobi-
lization tends to produce a decrease in the number of political decisions con-
cerning minority integration policy. This may indicate a deterioration of the
situation of migrants, as usually minority integration measures aim at creat-
ing better living conditions for resident migrants, but we cannot draw a firm
conclusion in this respect. Third, the solidarity movement displays ambiva-
lent results. On the one hand, immigration control policy is affected by its
mobilization, yet in a direction apparently opposed to the movement’s goals.
On the other hand, the movement seems to have been able to obtain a real
positive impact, but we do not know which specific issue field is affected by
its mobilization. Fourth, our analysis underscores above all the important
role played by institutional actors such as political parties to produce
changes in migration policy. Fifth, the claim-making by all types of actors in
the field of immigration and ethnic relations seems to influence the political
decision making in this field. However, while in France both pro-minority
and anti-minority claims have had an impact (especially on minority integra-
tion policy), in Switzerland only anti-minority claims have mattered. Sixth,
we have shown the strong impact of economic and socio-demographic con-
straints (as measured through the unemployment rate and the immigration
rate) on migration policy. Furthermore, this impact concerns above all im-
migration control policy, that is, the regulation of immigration flows.
THE ROLE OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC,
AND SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC RESOURCES
Thus far, the claim-making by political parties, the economic situation (un-
employment rate), and the socio-demographic pressure (immigration rate)
have been treated as other potential factors, in addition to the mobilization
of the three movements under study, that may affect migration policy or, to
use the social science jargon, as control variables. In this section, we con-
sider them as potential resources for migrant, extreme-right, and solidarity
movements, and would like to test the hypothesis that the chances of suc-
cess of these movements are greater when they can exploit such resources.
In other words, here we test the hypothesis that their impact on migration
policy is facilitated by the presence of these resources. Accordingly, the
questions we try to answer are the following: (1) Is the impact of migrant, 
extreme-right, and solidarity movements on migration policy facilitated by
the resources provided by the presence of parties as political allies, by the
economic situation as measured through the unemployment rate, and by the 
socio-demographic pressure as measured through the immigration rate? (2)
Which of these three types of external resources are more likely to improve
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the chances of success of the three movements under study? (3) Which of the
three movements was more ready to exploit these resources to influence po-
litical decisions in the field of immigration and ethnic relations?
Table 8.6 allows us to give an answer to these questions, though a very
tentative one. This table shows the results of regression analyses with the in-
teractive terms combining the mobilization of the three movements with the
indicators of, respectively, the political, economic, and socio-demographic
resources. The results for France and Switzerland are very different. The
most important finding concerning France is that migrants seem to take great
advantage of all three types of resources, as all three coefficients on pro-mi-
nority political decisions are positively significant. The other two move-
ments, in contrast, have not benefited from the resources available in their
environment. The significant coefficients for the extreme right could suggest
that there is an interactive effect with the claim-making by parties and the
economic situation, but the positive sign of the relationships prevents us
from speaking of a real effect, for an increase in the mobilization of the ex-
treme right produces an increase in pro-minority decisions, which in princi-
ple goes against the movement’s goals. Finally, no significant coefficient is
observed for the interactive terms referring to the solidarity movement.
The picture is in a way reversed in Switzerland. Here migrants do not seem
to have taken any advantage of the resources available in their political, eco-
nomic, and social environment. The most straightforward findings, however,
are those referring to the extreme right. All three regression coefficients for
this collective actor are statistically significant on minority integration policy.
Furthermore, the sign of the coefficient is negative. If, as we mentioned ear-
lier, this does not allow us to conclude that the impact of the extreme right
goes in the direction of its goals, a decline in political decisions concerning
the integration of resident migrants could well result in a deterioration of
their rights and position. Finally, we also observe a positive effect of the sol-
idarity movement in combination with changes in the unemployment rate
and the immigration rate.
In sum, the short analysis of the role of external resources in facilitating the
policy impact of the three movements under study suggests that the presence
of institutional allies which share the goals of the movements, the situation
on the labor marker, and the pressure coming from immigration flows are all
important resources which the movements can exploit to become more suc-
cessful in their attempt to influence migration policy. In other words, the im-
pact of migrant, extreme-right, and solidarity movements seems indeed to be
facilitated by political, economic, and socio-demographic resources. Fur-
thermore, all three types of resources have contributed, in combination with
mobilization, to policy change in the migration political field. Yet the answer
to the question which of the three movements was more ready to exploit
these resources depends on the country: migrants and the extreme right in
France, the extreme right and the solidarity movement in Switzerland.
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However, some caution must be taken in interpreting these findings. First
of all, unlike the previous ones, they are based on bivariate regressions. This
calls for wariness in the interpretation of results, as we do not control for the
effect of other factors, which was simply impossible because the political,
economic, and socio-demographic variables are included in the interactive
terms. We therefore cannot exclude that at least some of the relationships
may be spurious. Secondly, additional bivariate analyses (not shown) using
the same variables, but with the indicators of the mobilization by the three
movements instead of the interactive terms, suggest that in most cases the
latter have only a reinforcing effect. This holds particularly in the Swiss case.
CONCLUSION
The analysis presented in this chapter is very much exploratory. It was aimed
at sensitizing to a given approach to the study of the policy impact of social
movements rather than testing a theory of the effect of migrant, extreme-
right, and solidarity movements on migration policy. In order to obtain more
robust and consistent findings, we will certainly need to complement it with
other methods as well as new data. In spite of this cautionary remark, our
analysis suggests a number of interesting insights about the impact of social
movements within the political field of immigration and ethnic relations.
Previous work on the outcomes and consequences of social movements
have pointed to the powerlessness of these collective actors and the difficulty
for them to obtain substantive policy gains in the absence of external oppor-
tunities and resources. Similarly, specific studies of the mobilization in the mi-
gration political field have shown the poor policy impact of protest activities,
especially those carried by migrants themselves, which often have difficulties
to organize and mobilize (e.g., Blatt 1995; Ireland 1994; Miller 1981). Our
time-series analysis confirms this weakness. Migrants, in particular, seem to
reflect quite well the label of “poor people’s movements” (Piven and Cloward
1979), which have at their disposal little resources to intervene in the political
process and to influence policy making. Neither in France nor in Switzerland
have migrants been able to produce substantial policy changes. Extreme-right
and solidarity movements, the two movements formed by “full citizens,”
score a little better, but only in Switzerland and only to a limited extent.
If, on the one hand, our study confirms the lack of political influence of
social movements, especially those formed by migrants, who are to a large
extent excluded from the political game, it shows on the other hand that po-
litical, economic, and socio-demographic factors intervene in important
ways in the process leading to changes in migration policy. Not only these
factors impinge on the political decision-making on their own, but they pro-
vide to some extent external resources that the movements can exploit to
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reach their policy goals. Although, as we said, the results in this respect
should be taken with some caution, sometimes the claim-making by parties,
the economic situation, and the pressure coming from immigration flows can
improve the chances of success of the three movements we have examined.
The impact of the unemployment rate and the immigration rate shows that
political elites take the situation on the labor market and growing immigra-
tion into account. Furthermore, these two factors have their effect above all
on the regulation of immigration flows, which is the policy aspect that must
be modified in order to respond to such economic and socio-demographic
“threats.” The most consistent finding of our study, however, lies perhaps in
the crucial role played by political parties. Quite unsurprisingly given their
political status and legitimacy, these institutional actors are often able to in-
fluence policy making in the field of immigration and ethnic relations, and
sometimes they can also contribute to the impact of challenging groups.
Finally, contrary to our predictions, we have not found consistent evidence
that the prevailing models of citizenship affect the chances of success of
movements mobilizing in the migration political field. The influence of citi-
zenship and integration regimes should be felt on three levels. First, the
French more inclusive civic-based model should favor the impact of mi-
grants, as compared to the more exclusive ethnic-based model of Switzer-
land. This has not occurred. However, as can be seen in the analyses with the
interactive terms, migrants and minorities in France apparently had a positive
impact when political, economic, or socio-demographic resources were
available, whereas in Switzerland they have remained unsuccessful even in
the presence of such external resources. The more favorable environment in
terms of the collective definition of citizenship in France might therefore play
an indirect role, at least in regard to the impact of migrants on migration pol-
icy. Second, we should observe a greater impact of claim-making in general
on minority integration policy in France and on immigration control policy in
Switzerland, as claims pertaining to these two issues fields have both greater
political legitimacy and public resonance in the respective countries. We did
not find evidence of this. It rather appears that both in France and Switzer-
land claim-making is more likely to influence minority integration policy
(whereas economic and socio-demographic factors mostly affect immigra-
tion control policy). Third, for the same reason, we expected claim-making
in France, to a larger extent than in Switzerland, to influence political deci-
sions that improve the rights and position of migrants. Here there is some ev-
idence pointing to the role of models of citizenship, as in France both pro-
minority and anti-minority claims have had an impact on migration policy,
while in Switzerland only claims that are unfavorable to migrants seem to re-
ally matter. This might depend on the different models of citizenship in these
two countries, whereby the civic-based model of France gives greater politi-
cal legitimacy and public resonance to claims that stress the inclusion of mi-
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grants in the national community, while the ethnic-based model of Switzer-
land makes both more legitimate and resonant claims that underscore the ex-
clusion of migrants from the national community.
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Appendix 8.1. Description of Variables Used in the Analyses
Variable N
Name Label France Switzerland
MINACT Claims by migrants on migration issues 417 101
ERACT Claims by the extreme right on migration 
issues 298 109
SOLACT Claims by the solidarity movement on 
migration issues 428 151
PROMIN Pro-minority claims by non-state actors 1601 620
ANTIMIN Anti-minority claims by non-state actors 390 304
PROPART Pro-minority claims by parties 546 193
ANTIPART Anti-minority claims by parties 224 167
MIGRPOL Political decisions on migration issues 373 370
IMMPOL Political decisions on immigration and 
asylum issues 200 271
INTPOL Political decisions on integration issues 106 79
PROMP Pro-minority political decisions 182 184
ANTIMP Anti-minority political decisions 101 136
UNEMP Unemployment rate — —
IMMRATE Immigration rate — —
NOTE: Claim variables come from recodings in the original data. The other variables come from the
European System of Social Indicators (Social Indicators Department, ZUMA, Mannheim), except for the
unemployment rate in Switzerland for 1990 (Statistical Yearbook of Switzerland). The data on immigration
flows and the economic situation are available only on an annual basis. The actual values correspond to
the first quarter of each year. The values of the other three quarters are estimates by linear interpolation.
The number of cases refers to the number of claims in the original variables, which then have been
aggregated in the time series.
Appendix 8.2. List of Interactive Terms Used 
in the Analyses
Interactive Term Component Variables
MINPART MINACT * PROPART
MINUNEM MINACT * UNEMP
MINIMM MINACT * IMMRATE
ERPART ERACT * ANTIPART
ERUNEM ERACT * UNEMP
ERIMM ERACT * IMMRATE
SOLPART SOLACT * PROPART
SOLUNEM SOLACT * UNEMP
SOLIMM SOLACT * IMMRATE
NOTE: All interactive terms have been created multiply-
ing the two component variables.
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NOTES
1. We are alluding to the MERCI project (see below in the data and methods sec-
tion for more details).
2. It should be noted that the term “pluralist” here has absolutely no normative
meaning and the resulting system can lead to social and political segregation, as the
example of the South African Apartheid regime attests.
3. See below for information on the data sources and methods of analysis. Immi-
grant politics comprises both minority integration politics and claims regarding
racism and antiracism.
4. The MERCI (“Mobilization on Ethnic Relations, Citizenship, and Immigration”)
project includes the following country studies, in addition to France and Switzerland:
Germany (Ruud Koopmans), Great Britain (Paul Statham), and the Netherlands
(Thom Duyvené de Wit).
5. Le Monde in France and the Neue Zürcher Zeitung in Switzerland.
6. Since we want to assess the impact of claim-making on political decisions, pro-
minority and anti-minority claims exclude claims by state actors.
7. We exclude racism/antiracism from this analyses, as this is less institutionalized
and hence less policy-oriented an issue field than both immigration control policy
and minority integration policy.
8. It should be noted that pro-minority and anti-minority claims or decisions here
are to be intended in their broader meaning, i.e. as claims or decisions that (if real-
ized, in the case of claims) either improve or deteriorate the rights and position of mi-
grants in the host society, not necessarily as claims or decisions that are overtly in fa-
vor or against them.
9. The tables below show standardized regression coefficients generated with a
generalized least-squared method of estimation (Prais-Winsten) assuming a first-or-
der autoregressive process among the error terms, that is, a model of a time series in
which the current value of the series is a linear combination of previous values of the
series, plus a random error. The Durbin-Watson statistic is used to test for the pres-
ence of first-order autocorrelation (both positive and negative) in the residuals (or er-
ror terms) of a regression equation. It ranges between 0 and 4. In the case of a series
with 35 observations (such as those we use here) and 4 independent variables in the
equation (tables 2, 3, and 4), the null hypothesis that there is no significant correla-
tion in the residuals can be accepted (at the level of significance of 5 percent) if the
test statistics ranges between 1.73 and 2.27 (4  1.73). With five independent vari-
ables (table 5), the null hypothesis can be accepted if the test statistics ranges be-
tween 1.80 and 2.20 (4  1.80). When the test statistics ranges between 1.22 and 1.73
or between 2.27 and 2.78 (four independent variables), and when it ranges between
1.16 and 1.80 or between 2.20 and 2.84 (five independent variables), the null hy-
pothesis can neither be accepted nor rejected (situation of uncertainty). When the test
statistics is lower than 1.22 (four independent variables) or 1.16 (five independent
variables), the null hypothesis must be rejected and it is likely that there is positive
autocorrelation. Finally, when the test statistics is higher than 2.78 (four independent
variables) or 2.84 (five independent variables), the null hypothesis must be rejected
and it is likely that there is negative autocorrelation.
10. Here, however, we must keep in mind that extreme-right parties are included
in the extreme right, not among parties.
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